Alcaraz leads seeds Exodus; Fonseca hitting highs

50/50 — wide serves — short chips — high forehands — backhand grips

Four of the top eight seeds crashed out in round two of the Miami Masters this weekend. The fallen included world #3 Carlos Alcaraz (lost to Goffin), recent Indian Wells champion #7 Jack Draper (lost to Mensik), 2023 champion #8 Daniil Medvedev (lost to Munar), and #9 Andrey Rublev (lost to Bergs).

In addition to these upsets, local boy Ben Shelton fell to 20-year-old Coleman Wong; Ugo Humbert was taken to the sheds by Joao Fonseca; and Holger Rune was served out in a third set tiebreaker by servebot Reilly Opelka, to make that seven of the top-20 gone from the event after round two.

“The beauty of my game is I got a 50/50 with anybody. The bad part of my game is that I got a 50/50 with anybody.”

— Reilly Opelka for Tennis TV

Alcaraz’s loss to Goffin was the biggest upset. The Belgian served and played a brand of tennis that was reminiscent of Djokovic’s win over the Spaniard in the quarterfinal of the Australian Open two months prior. That is, excellent wide serving to the Alcaraz forehand on the deuce wing, as well as assuming an aggressive court position on returns and more generally in the rally.

Here was an early example of how well Goffin can handle and redirect pace on his backhand wing:

Ridiculous point and Alcaraz just missed that last forehand heater. One of those nights where he couldn’t quite find the magic, and Goffin showed what a quality player he is when putting it all together.

It also contained that defensive slice from Carlos, with Goffin managing to close on it and hit it from above the net on this occasion.

Later in the match — and on a big point — the Spaniard managed a better slice, but would be ruing missing the easier forehand in this two-shot pass:

Given Goffin’s exceptional baseline timing and ability to redirect pace, I was surprised to see Alcaraz not use his slice backhand more often, to both disrupt Goffin’s rhythm, and buy Carlos more time, like he did on this occasion late in the match:

Look how the court position shifts in the space of two slice backhands. Goffin was on the baseline to receive Alcaraz’s slice, and then having seen Alcaraz find a forehand off Goffin’s slice, the dynamics of the rally completely flipped. Goffin’s forehand isn’t such a weapon that he would run around and dictate all that much off an Alcaraz slice. It was a pretty low-risk strategy that I thought Alcaraz could have used more.

Again, this was a tactic that I thought Alcaraz should have used more often against an injured and aggressive Djokovic in Australia. An excerpt:

The Serb excels at linear hitting around the waist, so if you get it low and force him to sacrifice his racquet speed to vertical lift/spin generation, that slows his ball down, and it buys Alcaraz time to load up on his shots a little more with his body.

But besides the rally, the serve-return dynamic was the most interesting to me. Alcaraz averaged 201km/h on his first serve and hit eight aces, whereas Goffin’s was only 177 km/h for just three aces, but it was the Belgian who was more effective, winning 69% to Alcaraz’ 64%.

Goffin hit the majority of his first-serves into the forehand corner of Alcaraz on both sides, and he was wildly effective. Look at all the green, particularly on the deuce court (the large number of sliders out wide also partly explain the slower first-serve speed of Goffin):

Green = point won, Red = point lost, Yellow = ace. Barely a body serve from Goffin.

By comparison, Alcaraz was far more varied in his first-serve direction, mixing in the jamming body serve (unsuccessfully) against an aggressive Goffin. It looks like he should have stuck to the corners:

Perhaps most surprising about this result is that we’ve seen this tactic before from Alcaraz opponents (covered here with Djokovic in their most recent Australian Open quarterfinal clash, and Medvedev at Wimbledon 2024). At Wimbledon Medvedev totally dominated the Alcaraz deuce forehand return for a period of their semifinal clash:

But as I covered in Alcaraz’s 2024 Wimbledon victory over Djokovic, in that particular match Alcaraz learned quickly from his semifinal, and chipped his forehand return a lot in the final. An excerpt:

Of the 17 returns the Spaniard got a racquet on, 13 were directed to his forehand. This was the strategy that Medvedev had employed in the semifinal to great effect, and the one I felt Djokovic would find success with, but on Sunday, Alcaraz — ever the shapeshifter — morphed into a block aficionado. Of the 13 forehand returns Alcaraz hit, 10 were blocked. He won 7/10 of these points, often baiting Djokovic into the net and then passing or forcing a volley error.

Chip return to wash the speed out, chip backhand hit slow and short. This gets it below the net so Djokovic has to volley a backspin ball up and from below the net. It also buys Alcaraz more time to recover for defense by hitting it slower, further pressuring Djokovic to hit a better volley.

I also think Alcaraz likes a target on his running forehand, as opposed to having someone stay on the baseline.

Again, note the blocked/chipped return from Carlos, washing all the speed out of the ball to force Djokovic to generate. On this occasion Nole breaks the sideline with a great approach shot, but Carlos curls it back down the line like an inverted Nadal.

I only recall Alcaraz chipping his deuce forehand return twice (voluntarily — when stretched defensively he is forced to), midway through the second set from memory, and I couldn’t help but wonder if he should have both tried it sooner, and persisted for longer, considering that Goffin isn’t a particularly big hitter. Plus, the Belgian also hits relatively flat (especially off his backhand), rendering a chip return a pretty effective way to force Goffin to generate his own pace from low and short (that is, closer to the net) areas and move forward (not his M.O.) rather than simply trade and redirect linear power from the baseline (something far more in the Belgian’s wheelhouse).

short return is underrated against some opponents. Bublik did it well to Zverev in Montpellier, Federer often did it off his backhand intentionally to Roddick.

There’s a certain match-up where I feel short and low returns (intentional or otherwise) can be effective. Explosive movers with good hands — Alcaraz, Dimitrov, Federer — can use it against players who don’t excel at producing their own racquet and ball speed (Zverev, Medvedev, de Minaur) and who may not excel at the net (Rublev, Fritz, Medvedev).

From last year’s Indian Wells final piece:

Carlos opted out of the linear battle and started to play the ball above the shoulders and below the waist of Daniil. If there is a worthy criticism of Medvedev’s forehand, it is his lack of ability to generate power and spin outside his hip strike zone.

This lack of pace and spin injection means a skilled defender like Alcaraz can actually bait Medvedev into the net in a favourable manner. Federer used to do this to Roddick’s backhand. Chip low and short:

Medvedev does not want to come forward to the net against Alcaraz on low forehands.

There’s gotta be ten other examples in this one match from the Federer/Roddick highlights alone.

Here’s one from Rotterdam recently:

I even thought Dimitrov should have done it against Sinner in last year’s Miami final more, considering how out-gunned he was in the baseline-to-baseline exchanges. Forcing even someone of Sinner’s calibre to approach off a low slice means a likely slower and higher bouncing ball (by virtue of the opponent having to dedicate a lot of racquet speed to lifting the ball with spin to get it over the net and down into the court), or approaching off a slice themselves. It also means as an explosive mover and talented shot-maker, you get a target to aim for on your second shot in the rally, with an opponent who may not feel entirely comfortable on the net. Here’s an example:

Wash all the speed out of the serve, and even someone like Sinner has to dedicate a lot of racquet speed to lifting the ball. Sinner actually nailed that volley and won the point, but I still think this was an under-used strategy from Dimitrov, who is one of the most explosive and talented players on the stretch.

I think people often think of long rallies when you mention defence. But blocking returns is a great way to create a defensive situation with your anaerobic fuel tanks fully stocked. Given Alcaraz’s speed and court craft, I think he could employ it more often, especially now that the rest of the tour will be looking at this match and seeing another data point for the “Alcaraz forehand weakness” narrative.

At the other end of the returning spectrum, I was also surprised to see that not once by my viewing did Alcaraz drop back on second serves to look for a bigger cut or simple change of rhythm.

Both Goffin and Alcaraz won 55% of second serve points, and it was interesting to me that Alcaraz never ventured back to create a different ball, a change in rhythm, or simply to give a different look to perhaps create a seed of doubt in Goffin’s tactic and serving rhythm (he serve impeccably well in the third set).

It was at the 2022 Miami Masters — Alcaraz’s first masters title — that was the genesis of this graph that I display so often:

This North-South movement and deep-return shot-making has been a feature of his game since he first came on tour, but against Goffin, it all seemed so linear and baseline-hugging.

It was only 12 months ago that I wrote this of Alcaraz, having come back from a 6-1 first set drubbing against Sinner in their Indian Wells clash (emphasis added):

There’s always a certain tempo, place and height that players are comfortable playing in, but Alcaraz is the tennis equivalent of a jazz player, able to seamlessly change his spins, depths, and positions on the court in a bid to change the rhythm of a match. The more he leans into that feature, the more he can take his opponent’s out of theirs.

Against Sinner, Alcaraz created time in two ways: (1) he stood deeper on return; and (2) he used more height on his forehand, and added more slice on the backhand. He also stole time, by closing the net and taking the ball earlier after a good ball.

While the rest of the tour seems to be leaning into a linear, powerful, and unimodal baseline style, Alcaraz should be venturing further into what makes him unique, namely, his variation.

I don’t just mean the drop shot.

I mean the higher forehand returns from deep:

And the backhand returns from deep, too:

That’s the Alcaraz graph in full flight. Fence to net in two swings.

I mean the crush-and-rush second serves:

Alcaraz came forward 11 times on Sinner’s serve in their Beijing encounter last year. Ten were off his backhand, and he ended up with a very healthy 8/11 on these points.

I mean the slice backhands and sharply angled, shorter forehands:

All that variation is going to waste when he’s caught in linear battles with guys like Djokovic, Sinner, and Goffin.

It’s not from a lack of trying, perhaps. Alcaraz admitted to feeling off after the match:

"I didn't play well, and I didn't feel good physically either. In these kinds of matches, when you don't feel that confidence either in terms of tennis skills or physically, everything becomes much harder."

Alcaraz now turns his focus to the clay season; a surface that naturally helps the Spaniard lean into his variation and court craft.

---

Fonseca forehands (and backhands)

Fonseca took down Ugo Humbert in the second round on Saturday, becoming the youngest player since Alcaraz to reach the third round of a Masters, and the youngest since Juan Martin del Potro to reach the third round of the Miami Masters.

That’s good forehand company.

And speaking of forehands, one of the little quirks of the Brazilian’s cannon is that he often opts to take it from way above his shoulders. I first noticed it in Buenos Aires:

He hits this above his head.

And he does it time and again. Contact way above the head:

Moutet could smash that.

It’s almost like he opts to take the ball at the peak of the bounce, where the ball is just sitting there, no matter how high it might get above the shoulder.

Another little quirk of his game is how extreme his top hand is on the backhand. Most players are some variation of eastern with their left hand, but Fonseca is all semi-western:

Compare Fils’ top-hand thumb knuckle and subsequent extended wrist position with Fonseca’s neutral wrist:

thumbs straddling opposite sides of the top of the grip.

More on that in a later article.

Grips aside, Fonseca left an impression on Humbert:

Fonseca takes on de Minaur in round three in what should be a great match.

Might be back later in the event with other things that catch my eye. See you in the comments. HC.