Alcaraz x Struff: Madrid Final Analysis

return positions—neutralising Alcaraz—Madrid conditions

Carlos Alcaraz defeated Lucky Loser Jan-Lennard Struff 6/4 3/6 6/3 in the final of the Madrid Masters 1000 on Sunday to defend his title and extend his win streak to 10 matches since his clay season began in Barcelona.¹ To Struff’s credit, it was only the second set the Spaniard had dropped in his last 10 matches on clay.

Coming into the final both men boasted strong serving numbers, courtesy of the Madrid conditions playing a little faster through the air. However, the difference in the percentage of return games won highlighted the superior court coverage and return prowess of Alcaraz.

Struff has beaten Alcaraz before, at Roland Garros in 2021, and pushed him to five sets at Wimbledon last year. Clearly has the style of play to trouble the Spaniard.

Struff began the year ranked #167 after a poor 2022. However, in 2023 the 33-year-old German has already racked up 34 wins across Challengers, ATP qualifying, and ATP main draw appearances.² His run to the Madrid final came off the back of some big serving and very aggressive return strategies that have paid off in the quick conditions.

A nervous opening game from Struff where he threw in two double faults gifted the early lead to Alcaraz. In contrast, a confident defending champion made his intentions clear on his first serve from the outset, jamming Struff with a fast body serve to prevent him from getting a swing on the return.

A sliding serve into the body is a great tactic to reduce the aggression of a returner.

However, Struff made Alcaraz pay twice in the second game when he got the line wrong, highlighting why he was a deserved finalist:

Struff with the 152km/h return zinger. Look how far inside the baseline he takes this. A second serve is often the shortest ball you can get in a rally against a world-class aggressive baseliner like Alcaraz. It was a courageous and smart tactic.

Struff opted to take on the Alcaraz first serve as well. Taking it inside the baseline with a short backswing.

TennisTV Commentator: “It puts a little more premium on hitting your spot on serve.”

Struff’s aggression paid off in the fourth game as he broke back with more big hitting. An increasingly frustrated Alcaraz struggled to adapt early on to the pace of play and the willingness of Struff to play big from the back and come forward.

TennisTV Commentator: “He [Alcaraz] just looks rushed. It’s not too dissimilar to what [Emil] Ruusuvuori did to him in the first match. Just teeing off and taking the game to him.”

Struff would venture forward 52 times in the match, winning 33 of those points for a very healthy 63% win rate. Many times it was off the back of his first serve, capitalizing on Alcaraz’s very deep return position (not dissimilar to what Alcaraz did to Medvedev at Indian Wells in March). The camera angle for much of the seventh game of the first set provided a court-level view of this tactic playing out:

By serving wide and playing this volley short, Struff maximizes the distance Alcaraz must cover and also ensures he can’t get a topspin passing shot.

When a player returns from a deeper position like Alcaraz above, there is a tradeoff: they buy more “time” (as the ball takes longer to reach them) yet make the court “bigger” for their opponent (firstly, by simply being further back it opens up the forecourt, but they are also forced to take a wider stance to cover the angled serve). Observe below how far to the right Alcaraz is positioned in order to cover the wide serve. A returner taking a more neutral position just behind the baseline would usually have their right foot intersecting with the singles sideline.

From this deep return position Alcaraz must stand further to the right of the singles line to cover the wide serve.

However, Alcaraz also makes the court feel “smaller” to his opponent by virtue of his speed and court coverage. It forces opponents to push for the line. Often they push too hard on regulation shots:

This is an easy volley but Struff knows how fast Alcaraz is and ends up overplaying it.

And the added time—especially on second serves—also allows Alcaraz to find more forehands to start (and promptly finish, in this case) return points:

This dichotomy in return positions and tactics was countered by each man with very deliberate serving patterns. Observe the stark difference for first serves on the deuce side.

Alcaraz (left) served 61% into the body of Struff in a bid to jam the German's swing. In stark contrast, Struff almost exclusively picked corners in a bid to get Alcaraz reaching and find a clear path forward to the net with an easier volley (and to avoid giving Alcaraz a chance to take a big cut at a forehand).

And their return positions (left side is Alcaraz):

Alcaraz (top and bottom left) and Struff return positions. Top images are first-serve returns, bottom are second serve returns.

Struff played a tactically smart match today. He knew he didn’t have the movement or rally edge, and he committed to a strategy that gave him the best chance of winning. It also meant he forced Alcaraz into a mode of play he isn’t used to; Alcaraz didn’t venture forward too much or get an opportunity to play many drop shots. It paid off handsomely at the start of the second set, again with some returning that Agassi would be proud of:

A second serve is often the shortest ball you will get in a rally against Alcaraz.

The other reason that makes this return strategy very effective is that attacking right after the serve ensures that Alcaraz’s defense is limited due to his position right on the baseline; he doesn’t have time to drop back and use his speed right after the serve, and this forces him into abbreviated strokes and weaker replies.

Early in the second Struff caught fire with his aggression.

Ultimately, while this was a high-risk brand of tennis that neutralized the best defender in the game, there are few players (and to an extent, conditions) that are capable of pulling this brand of tennis off this well. Struff has a big serve, is an accomplished net player with a strong doubles resume, and was absolutely lasering his groundstrokes and returns for the better part of 90 minutes. I can’t think of too many other players who could get in this mindset, let alone execute this type of tennis (Rune, Tiafoe, Kyrgios, and Bublik come to mind³). As Alcaraz said in his on-court post-match presser:

“Jan was really really aggressive. Sometimes I couldn’t play my game, just waiting for my chances…but I told myself I have to be positive all the time. I was going to have my chances, and I think I did in the third set.”

A graph from Twitter user Vestige_du_jour highlights the reduced forehand topspin of players in Madrid compared to Monte Carlo last month:

Forehand spins were down 7% in Madrid compared to Monte Carlo for players who were entered in both events.

While Struff’s pressing gameplan thwarted Alcaraz’s ability to use the drop shot, by my count Alcaraz still won 6/7 points when he did use it, with 4 of the 7 attempts coming from his less common backhand wing. His ability to execute under pressure is ridiculous. This one below came in a huge moment early in the third that helped him secure the pivotal break point. If he misses it, he’s a fool. If he makes it, he’s a genius:

He’s a genius.

A look at the rap sheet:

Here we see where Alcaraz just slowly grinded Struff down with his deep position return tactic, earning a much higher percentage of unreturned serves (36% v 24%). Struff’s ace-rate % was hovering above 8% coming into the final but was kept below 4% against Alcaraz. A pretty average forehand day from Carlos also, who sprayed quite a few loose balls at times.

By my count using my proposed metrics:

An uncharacteristically loose day for Alcaraz’s forehand without pressure. And an impressive lack of errors from Struff given how hard he went at the ball today.

I think it’s important to recognize that Madrid has some unique conditions that don’t really reflect what conditions at RG will be like in a few weeks’ time, so with Rome around the corner, and with Sinner, Djokovic, and the rest of the top-10 in the draw (although still no Nadal), it should give us a good picture of how this year’s clay slam is shaping up. A look at the top 10:

I’ll be back during Rome with some more match analyses.

1. Struff lost to Karatsev in the qualifying draw of Madrid, then defeated him in the semi-finals of the main draw. A peculiar aspect of tennis is that you can win a tournament having already lost in it, as Struff nearly did today.

2. Struff has always been a dangerous prospect in tennis, posting a 12-33 record against the top-10 in his career prior to the meeting with Alcaraz.

3. Cressy kind of embodies this level of aggression without necessarily having the forehand or backhand competency of Struff though.